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Abstract
This paper examines the e↵ect of an R&D-specific labor supply shock produced
by the establishment of tertiary vocational education institutions teaching and con-
ducting applied R&D, the Universities of Applied Sciences, on the R&D personnel of
private firms. We apply a di↵erence-in-di↵erences model, exploiting a quasi-natural
experiment in the 1990s in Switzerland, the staggered establishment of these in-
stitutions. Using repeated cross-sectional data from the Swiss Earnings Structure
Survey, we can precisely measure the R&D personnel of private firms, i.e., how
much R&D personnel a firm employs and how much a firm spends on its R&D
personnel in terms of wages. The education-driven labor supply shock has positive
e↵ects on both the percentage of R&D personnel and the wages paid to this per-
sonnel. Our assessments of e↵ect heterogeneity suggest that these e↵ects are driven
by firms with 50 to 99 employees and firms in the manufacturing sector increasing
their R&D personnel.
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1 Introduction
Providing individuals with the necessary skills to engage in innovative activities is a major
concern of policymakers because individuals are the key driver of the innovative capacities
of actors in an economy. Private firms, which constitute the largest part of these actors,
rely on the individual skills of their R&D personnel to produce innovations. Therefore,
governments constantly expand public education, especially tertiary-level education, to
provide individuals with the skills necessary for innovation (OECD, 2010, 2017).
Indeed, the availability of individual skills provided by tertiary education institutions
on regional labor markets is important for private R&D. Numerous studies on how ed-
ucation influences innovation emphasize that research undertaken by academic universi-
ties, the main producers of high-skilled human capital, foster private R&D (e.g., Autant-
Bernard, 2001; Falk, 2006; Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2007; Ja↵e, 1989). A growing strand
of this literature investigates the e↵ect of opening new tertiary education institutions on
innovation and provides causal evidence for a positive e↵ect (e.g., Andrews, 2017; Pfister
et al., 2017). Other studies show that the educational composition of the workforce is fun-
damental in determining private R&D (e.g., Becker and Pain, 2008; Garcia and Mohnen,
2010; Wang, 2010). Regional skill resources thus constitute a central factor influencing
private sector R&D.
However, no evidence exists on how private firms adjust their R&D personnel to an
education-driven labor supply shock. In an analysis of an educational reform that results
in such a shock, investigating whether and to which extent firms make use of the new skills
on the labor market for R&D purposes is important. After all, an educational reform only
achieves its goal of stimulating private R&D through the provision of individual skills, if
private firms actually use these skills to perform R&D. More specifically, observing if firms
employ more R&D personnel and if this new R&D personnel is valuable to these firms is
crucial for evaluating the e↵ectiveness of such an educational reform. Furthermore, unlike
other measures commonly used in the literature on private R&D, e.g., R&D expenditures
that might also include the financing of R&D projects that public research institutions
then actually carry out, our measure does not include anything else but R&D a firm
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actively performs itself.
Therefore, this paper analyzes how an education-driven shock in R&D-specific labor
supply a↵ects the R&D personnel of private firms. This shock was the result of the
establishment of Universities of Applied Sciences (UAS), tertiary vocational education
institutions that teach and conduct applied R&D, in Switzerland (see, e.g., Pfister et al.,
2017). UAS provide novel sets of (research) skills to their graduates, distinguishing them
from academic university graduates. We focus on the establishment of UAS campuses in
the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), i.e., campuses
that produce a stock of R&D-specific skills in the regions where they are located, to
investigate how such a labor supply shock a↵ects the R&D personnel of private firms
regarding the employment of R&D personnel and the wages paid to R&D employees. In
doing so, we can determine if firms use the R&D-specific skills on the labor market for
their R&D purposes, i.e., if they employ more R&D personnel, and if these skills are
valuable to firms, i.e., if they spend more on R&D personnel in terms of wages.
To estimate the e↵ect of the shock, we exploit quasi-natural variation in the location
and the timing of the establishment of UAS campuses in the 1990s. We apply a di↵erence-
in-di↵erences (DiD) design to compare R&D personnel of firms in the treatment group
(i.e., firms in regions where a UAS campus was established) to R&D personnel of firms in
the control group (i.e., firms in regions where a UAS campus has not been established).
To do so, we draw on repeated cross-sectional data from the Swiss Earnings Structure
Survey (ESS) that allows us to precisely measure firms’ R&D personnel, i.e., the number
of employed R&D personnel (defined as personnel with R&D as their main job activitiy)
and the wages paid to these R&D employees. This measurement enables us to determine
whether the educational reform of introducing UAS and the resulting labor supply shock
had the desired e↵ect on private firms. Moreover, we assess whether the treatment e↵ect
is heterogeneous across firms with di↵erent size and in di↵erent industry sectors.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature and
discusses how an R&D-specific labor supply shock can influence private firms. Section
3 describes the ESS data we use for our analysis and our measures of R&D personnel.
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Section 4 presents and discusses the DiD approach we use to identify the treatment
e↵ect. Section 5 reports the main results, the assessments of e↵ect heterogeneity and the
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 R&D-Specific Skills and Private R&D
2.1 Literature Review
To be able to produce innovative outputs, private firms need personnel with specific skills
in their fields that enable them to perform R&D. Tertiary education institutions provide
their graduates with such specific skills in the respective field of study. Studies investigat-
ing spillovers from academic universities to private R&D confirm that firms profit from
these academic universities, and that these spillovers are concentrated on firms located
in proximity to an academic university (e.g., Anselin et al., 1997; Autant-Bernard, 2001;
Falk, 2006; Ja↵e, 1989). The findings of studies investigating how the proportion of indi-
viduals with R&D skills in the workforce, i.e., the proportion of individuals with a tertiary
educational degree, a↵ects private R&D point in the same direction (e.g., Vandenbussche
et al., 2006; Wang, 2010).
A growing strand of the literature shows that, besides the skills of academic university
graduates, applied (research) skills are important for private R&D. For example, in a
recent study on energy research, Popp (2017) finds that non-university government in-
stitutions have a greater influence on private applied R&D than academic universities.
Cinnirella and Streb’s (2017) assessment of 19th century Prussia identifies the knowledge
of “master craftsmen”, i.e., applied knowledge in a specific occupation, as an important
driver of technological development. For Italy, Bianchi and Giorcelli (2017) show that
after opening university STEM education in Italy to graduates of technical high schools,
the previously lower-achieving technical high school students are more likely to become
inventors, while their previously higher-achieving peers are less likely.
For Switzerland, Pfister et al. (2017) use the same quasi-natural experiment that we
use in this paper, the establishment of UAS, to identify the causal e↵ect of opening applied
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research institutions on the development of patents. They find that the applied knowledge
of these research institutions has a positive e↵ect on the quantity and the quality of
patents. However, whether this e↵ect is driven only by R&D that the UAS perform
themselves or whether private firms’ R&D contributes to the e↵ect remains unclear.
While the empirical evidence shows that firms rely on skilled personnel to produce
innovations, and that individuals with applied (research) skills in their respective fields
yield innovative potential, no evidence exists on how private firms adjust their R&D
personnel to an education-driven labor supply shock. We do so by investigating the e↵ect
of such a labor supply shock on firms’ R&D personnel in terms of employment numbers,
i.e., how many of a firm’s employees actually perform R&D as their main job activitiy,
and in terms value, i.e., how much a firm spends on the wages of these employees.
Therefore, this paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, we are
able to identify the causal e↵ect of how firms react to the availability of R&D-specific skills
by exploiting a unique quasi-natural experiment that led to an R&D-specific labor supply
shock. Second, we observe how firms adjust their R&D personnel, i.e., their actual labor
input into their production of new knowledge, to such a shock. In comparison to other
measures of private R&D, such as R&D expenditures or R&D investments, R&D personnel
does not include, e.g., contract research that private firms finance but external research
institutions actually undertake. Furthermore, R&D personnel is the more appropriate
measure for analyzing a labor supply shock, because it reflects whether firms actually
employ the new type of labor for its intended purpose.
2.2 The Labor Supply Shock Induced by Universities of Applied
Sciences
The R&D-specific labor supply shock we analyze was the result of the establishment of
UAS during the 1990s in Switzerland. This establishment was a fundamental reform of the
Swiss tertiary education system, which consists of both a vocational and an academic track
at the upper secondary and the tertiary levels (according to the ISCED classification).
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Before the reform, students from the vocational track1 had no possibility of acquiring a
tertiary level educational degree equivalent to an academic university degree. The goal of
the UAS was to create such a possibility2.
As opposed to academic universities, UAS provide their students with applied, not
theoretical, knowledge in the respective field of study. As a result, the skill sets of UAS
graduates and university graduates di↵er substantially. This di↵erence is particularly
pronounced for students in STEM. For example, an academic university graduate with
a degree in electrical engineering might be able to achieve theoretical progress in how to
more e ciently convert solar energy to electricity, whereas a UAS graduate seeks to apply
new theoretical knowledge in the actual development of a new photovoltaic system. In
addition, as the reform law requires the UAS themselves to perform applied research, they
collaborate more frequently with private firms than academic universities (Arvanitis et al.,
2008). We therefore argue that due to their novel skill sets, UAS graduates (especially
in STEM) are better suited for the R&D purposes of private firms than are graduates of
academic universities.
From a theoretical viewpoint, in a simple model of labor supply and demand we
would expect firms to employ more R&D personnel for lower wages as a result of the
R&D-specific labor supply shock. Assuming that the demand for R&D-specific labor is
independent of all other types of labor, the reservation wage of individuals with R&D-
specific skills decreases due to the increase in R&D-specific labor supply and the resulting
greater competition on the job market. At the same time, the firms’ knowledge about the
R&D-specificity of the skills of applicants who graduated from a UAS on one hand, and
more options in the R&D personnel selection process on the other reduce hiring costs.
Consequently, the sum of wages firms pay to their R&D personnel might either decrease
1 About 70% of individuals who completed compulsory school opt for the vocational track by starting
with a dual vocational education and training (VET) program involving apprenticeship, see
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/education-science/diploma/upper-secondary.html
(last retrieved December 11, 2017).
2 In addition to providing VET graduates a formal education equivalent to that of academic
universities, UAS are legally required to apply scientific methods and knowledge in their teaching
and research, to provide services to public or private sector firms, and to collaborate with firms and
other research institutions. For further information on UAS and their legal mandates, see
Projektgruppe Bund–Kantone Hochschullandschaft 2008 (2004); SERI (2015).
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or increase, depending on the magnitude of the e↵ect on R&D-specific hirings.
However, the actual e↵ect of the labor supply shock on firms’ R&D personnel depends
on the value of UAS graduates’ skills and the complementarity of these skills to those
of other employees. Assuming that UAS graduates’ skills are better suited for the R&D
purposes of private firms than the skills of the R&D personnel they employed before the
UAS establishment, firms might either replace their R&D personnel with UAS graduates
(i.e., UAS graduates and other R&D personnel are substitutes and the number of R&D
personnel remains unchanged) or hire UAS graduates as additional R&D personnel (i.e.,
UAS graduates and other R&D personnel are complements and the number of R&D
personnel increases). Under this assumption and independent of whether UAS graduates
and other R&D personnel are substitutes or complements, UAS graduates have a higher
value for firms than other R&D personnel. Therefore, firms might pay higher wages to
their R&D personnel after the UAS establishment.
3 Data
To estimate the e↵ect of the R&D-specific labor supply shock on firms’ R&D personnel,
we use the largest representative firm survey available in Switzerland, the ESS. The Swiss
Federal Statistical O ce (SFSO), which started the ESS in 1994, has ever since conducted
it biennially, thus covering the relevant period of the UAS establishment. For every wave,
the SFSO draws a new stratified random sample of all firms in Switzerland, with survey
participation being mandatory. Our data thus constitute repeated cross sections.
The ESS contains information on more than 300,000 firm-year observations between
1994 and 2014, and each firm provides detailed information on its employees3. Until 2010,
this information comprises the main job activity of every employee—e.g., construction,
secretarial, R&D—thereby allowing us to identify the number of employees working in
3 The number of employees that each firm reports in the survey depends on firm size: Firms with
fewer than 20 employees report information on every employee; firms with at least 20 and fewer than
50 employees randomly report every second employee; and firms with 50 employees or more
randomly report every third employee. However, as the data show that some firms chose to report
more observations than necessary, we do not rely on the three firm size categories when calculating
the variables for our estimations.
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R&D in each firm4. In addition to the employee’s main job activity, the ESS provides
each employee’s wage. The dataset also contains each employee’s personal characteristics
(e.g., gender, age, nationality, and employment level) and firm characteristics (e.g., firm
size and industry sector). Given the number of observations and the rich information at
both the individual and firm levels, the ESS is well suited for analyzing the e↵ect of the
R&D-specific labor supply shock on firms’ R&D personnel.
From the information in the ESS, we calculate four outcome variables that represent
firms’ R&D personnel (see appendix A.1 for a mathematical definition of these outcome
variables). First, the percentage of R&D personnel (RDP pct) gives the number of em-
ployees with R&D as their main job activity relative to the total number of employees
within a firm, adjusted to full-time equivalents. Second, the full-time equivalent number
of R&D personnel (RDP num) describes the absolute number of R&D employees. Third,
the percentage of R&D wages (RDW pct) indicates the sum of wages paid to R&D em-
ployees relative to the total sum of wages paid to all employees. And fourth, the sum
of R&D wages (RDW sum) is the absolute sum of wages paid to R&D employees. With
this set of dependent variables, we can investigate if firms employ more R&D personnel
and if the value of R&D personnel to firms increases. As the firms can only report one
single job activity per employee, our outcome variables can be considered lower bounds
and reliable measures of R&D personnel.
From the individual employee information in the ESS, we compute a number of firm
characteristics, which enter our estimations as control variables. These characteristics
include the composition of a firm’s workforce for gender (percentage of women), age
(average age), tenure (average tenure), and nationality (percentage of non-Swiss citizens).
Other firm level control variables from the ESS are firm size (categorized as proposed in
OECD, 2015, p. 206) and industry sector (in 13 categories of NOGA 2002 classification5).
The ESS provides the “mobilite´ spatiale” (MS) regions, that is, homogeneous micro-
regions whose construction relies on—among other things—regional mobility analyses
4 R&D is one of 24 categories in the job activity variable.
5 Categories B, P, and Q are not observed in our regression sample. We excluded firms in category L,
because these can be considered public rather than private firms. For an overview of the NOGA
2002 categories see appendix A.6
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and structural labor markets (Schuler et al., 2005), to determine the location of firms.
Therefore MS regions are well suited for our analysis. The next higher administrative
regions are the cantons6 and the next lower the municipalities7, although the MS regions
themselves are no administrative regions. A canton consists on average of approximately
four MS regions, and an MS region consists on average of approximately 22 municipalities.
Moreover, we add two regional control variables serving as proxies for time-variant regional
development in our estimations: Unemployment rates at the cantonal level8 and the overall
population number of an MS region9.
4 Methodology
4.1 Identification Strategy
We use the identification strategy of Pfister et al. (2017) and exploit the quasi-natural
variation in the location and the timing of the UAS campus establishment to estimate the
causal e↵ect of the resulting R&D-specific labor supply shock on firms’ R&D personnel.
Between 1997 and 2003, 15 UAS campuses in STEM were established in the German-
speaking part of Switzerland (see figure 1 for an overview), where the VET system is more
culturally and institutionally embedded. Following Pfister et al. (2017), we argue that
because the location decisions for these campuses are the result of political rather than
economic factors10, the establishment of these campuses functions as a natural experiment.
To estimate how firms adjust their R&D personnel after the R&D-specific labor supply
6 Switzerland has 26 cantons, which function similarly to states in the US
7 Municipalities are similar to US counties.
8 Data are provided by the State Secretariate for Economics A↵airs, see
https://www.amstat.ch/v2/index.jsp?lang=de (last retrieved on March 8, 2017). There are 13 MS
regions stretching across cantonal borders. We weight the unemployment rates from the respective
cantons for these MS regions according to the population size in each of the cantons and then use
the weighted average in our estimations.
9 Data are provided by the SFSO, see
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/e↵ectif-change/regional-
distribution%20.assetdetail.3222022.html (last retrieved on March 14, 2017). We obtain the
population number of an MS region by aggregating these municipality-level data at the MS region
level.
10 For a comprehensive description and investigation of the campus decision process see Pfister et al.
(2017).
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shock, we apply the DiD model
Yi,t,r =  0 +  1UASi,t 3,r +  2t+  3r +  4Xi,t,r + µi,t,r (1)
with t: survey year, r: MS region, Y : dependent variable (RDP pct, RDP num, RDW pct,
or RDW sum), UAS: treatment dummy, X: vector of control variables, and µ: error term.
We use a time lag of three years between the establishment of a UAS campus and an
expected treatment e↵ect because of the standard curriculum length of six semesters and
an average graduation time of slightly more than three years. For example, the campus in
Winterthur was established in 1998; according to the standard curriculum of six semesters,
the first graduates leave the UAS and enter the labor market in 2001. As we use biennial
data and do not observe firms in 2001, in equation 1 we observe that UASi,t 3,r = 0 if
t  2000 and UASi,t 3,r = 1 if t   2002 for all firms in the Winterthur campus treatment
region. For firms in the Burgdorf campus treatment region, which was established in
1997, UASi,t 3,r = 1 if t   2000. The three-year time lag is the most conservative lag for
our model and might lead to an underestimation of the true treatment e↵ect, because the
lag neglects students who stay at the UAS for a longer time (e.g., due to part-time work
during studies).
Finally, the model includes a set of survey-year dummies, MS region dummies and
control variables. The survey-year dummies control for any unobserved time trends,
irrespective of whether a firm is assigned to the treatment or to the control group. As the
MS region dummies control for any unobserved time-invariant regional characteristics,
they also capture the di↵erence between the treatment and the control group. The vector
of other control variables includes the firm and region characteristics as described in
section 3.
We estimate the model both for the entire sample of firms surveyed in the ESS and
for the subsample of firms that conduct R&D, i.e., firms which have at least one R&D
employee. The estimations for the entire sample allow us to examine whether the R&D-
specific labor supply shock has an average e↵ect on the population of surveyed firms.
The size of the treatment e↵ect for firms that actually profit from the R&D-specific labor
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supply shock is given by the estimations for the subsample of R&D firms.
4.2 Definition of Treatment and Control Group
The MS regions allow us to identify whether a firm is located in the treatment or the con-
trol group. As Pfister et al. (2017) demonstrate, Swiss individuals are not very mobile,
with a maximum commuting distance of about 25 kilometers. Following their argumen-
tation, we assume that local labor markets for UAS graduates emerge in areas within
a 25-kilometer travel distance radius of a UAS campus. We thus consider a firm to be
treated if its distance to the closest UAS campus is 25 kilometers or less.
As the MS regions constitute a classification whose geographical level lies between the
cantons and the municipalities, they do not allow us to construct exact borders of the
25-kilometer area around a UAS campus. However, MS regions allow us to calculate the
treatment intensity, i.e., the dosage of the treatment for each MS region. Using population
data at the municipality level11, we define all individuals living in a municipality within
25 kilometers of a UAS campus as treated and aggregate them at the MS region level.
Consequently, for every MS region we know the percentage of its treated population
relative to its overall population. This percentage of treated individuals is the treatment
intensity (TI), which is graphically illustrated for each German-speaking MS region in
Figure 1.
Following the findings of Pfister et al. (2017), we expect the treatment e↵ect to be
concentrated within the 25-kilometer radius around a UAS campus. Therefore, we assign
all firms in MS regions with TI = 100% (i.e., the MS regions whose entire population lives
within 25 kilometers of a UAS campus) to the treatment group. We then assign all firms
in MS regions with TI < 100% (i.e., only a part or none of the MS region’s population
lives within 25 kilometers of a UAS campus) to the control group. This assignment
procedure leads to an underestimation of the true treatment e↵ect, because the control
group contains treated firms located within 25 travel kilometers of a UAS campus, i.e.,
11 Data are provided by the SFSO, see https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/catalogues-
databases/tables.assetdetail.3222022.html (last retrieved on March 14,
2017).
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Figure 1: Location of UAS STEM campuses and Treatment Intensities of MS Regions
Source: Own illustration with geodata from SFSO, GEOSTAT (Ge-
neralisierte Gemeindegrenzen der Schweiz, Ausgabe 2015) available from
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/dienstleistungen/geostat/geodaten-
bundesstatistik/administrative-grenzen/generalisierte-gemeindegrenzen.assetdetail.330759.html
(last retrieved on December 11, 2017) and population from SFSO, available from
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/catalogues-databases/tables.assetdetail.3222022.html
(last retrieved on March 14, 2017).
our estimation results provide a lower bound of the true treatment e↵ect.
4.3 Assessment of Parallel Trends Assumption
The crucial assumption of a DiD model is the parallel trends assumption, i.e., that both
treatment and control group have to show the same time trend in the dependent variable
in absence of the treatment. In our case, the first UAS campuses in STEM were founded
in 1997. With the three-year time lag, the first treatment year is thus 2000. To investi-
gate whether the parallel trends assumption holds, for the pre-treatment period we run
regressions of all our dependent variables on a set of survey year dummies, their interac-
tions with an indicator of whether a firm belongs to the treatment group, and MS region
dummies that capture time-invariant regional di↵erences (and therefore also di↵erences
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between the treatment and control group), as follows:
Yi,t,r =  0 +  2t+  3UASi,r ⇥ t+  4r + ⌫i,t,r (2)
with ⌫: error term.
Table 1 provides the results of these regressions that test for di↵ering pre-treatment
trends as specified in equation 2. In addition, Appendix A.3 illustrates the development
of each dependent variable in the treatment and control group, both for the entire sample
and the subsample of firms conducting R&D. These figures suggest that the pre-treatment
trends of some of the dependent variables slightly di↵er12. However, judging by the
interaction term coe cients and the F -test for joint significance of these coe cients in
Table 1, these di↵erences are not statistically significant. Therefore, we conclude that the
DiD approach is appropriate to identify the causal e↵ect of the R&D-specific labor supply
shock on firms’ R&D personnel.
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
Table 2 provides the OLS estimation results of the DiD approach specified in equation 1.
According to the treatment e↵ect in column (1) of panel A in Table 2, the R&D-specific
labor supply shock led to an increase in the percentage of R&D personnel of treated
firms by 0.17 percentage points. This treatment e↵ect is statistically significant at the
five percent level. Given that the average of percentage of R&D personnel is 1.13%, a
0.17 percentage points increase is also economically significant. As for the percentage of
R&D personnel of only the subsample of firms conducting R&D, the treatment e↵ect of
1.31 percentage points in column (1) of panel B in Table 2 is economically significant in
magnitude as well as statistically significant at the ten percent level.
Somewhat surprisingly, we find no statistically significant treatment e↵ects on the
12 For example, while the trends go in the same direction for dependent variable RDP pct, they
approach one another before 2000.
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Table 1: Pre-Treatment Trends Tests Using OLS Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RDP pct RDP num RDW pct RDW sum
Panel A: Entire Sample
1996 0.09 0.50 0.04 3,113.66
(0.21) (0.58) (0.20) (3,729.36)
1998 0.02 0.38 0.03 2,931.67
(0.18) (0.56) (0.18) (3,791.97)
UASi ⇥ 1996 0.00 0.25 0.06 2,756.20
(0.28) (1.25) (0.28) (8,423.06)
UASi ⇥ 1998 -0.14 -0.28 -0.19 -1,291.24
(0.25) (1.12) (0.25) (6,092.18)
F -test for joint significance of UASi ⇥ t 0.20 0.08 0.47 0.10
R2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Observations 15,546 15,546 15,546 15,546
Panel B: R&D Sample
1996 -1.78 5.16 -2.21 29,339.58
(2.61) (9.26) (2.55) (59,324.70)
1998 1.59 7.44 1.93 57,417.49
(2.76) (10.11) (2.76) (69,018.14)
UASi ⇥ 1996 1.42 -7.44 1.88 -33,561.08
(3.38) (18.45) (3.38) (123,705.09)
UASi ⇥ 1998 -2.02 -9.85 -2.87 -58,239.79
(3.51) (18.75) (3.49) (128,859.31)
F -test for joint significance of UASi ⇥ t 0.48 0.16 0.92 0.11
R2 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.09
Observations 956 956 956 956
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include intercept and MS region fixed e↵ects.
Coe cients and standard errors in columns (1) and (3) are multiplied by 100 to represent percentage
point changes. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
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Table 2: OLS Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RDP pct RDP num RDW pct RDW sum
Panel A: Entire Sample
UASi,t 0.17⇤⇤ 0.19 0.20⇤⇤⇤ 2,224.42⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.26) (0.04) (951.18)
Sample mean of dependent variable 1.13 1.12 1.17 7,042.31
R2 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.12
Observations 161,367 161,367 161,367 161,367
Panel B: R&D Sample
UASi,t 1.31⇤ -0.13 1.52⇤⇤⇤ 46,615.95⇤⇤⇤
(0.76) (3.76) (0.38) (12,709.17)
Sample mean of dependent variable 19.42 19.20 19.98 155.855,87
R2 0.47 0.40 0.44 0.37
Observations 9,409 9,409 9,409 9,409
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include intercept, year fixed e↵ects,
MS region fixed e↵ects, firm-level control variables, and region-level control variables. Coe cients,
standard errors, and sample means dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) are multiplied by 100
to represent percentage point changes. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
number of R&D personnel (table 2, column 2). The coe cients in both samples are
economically and statistically insignificant, and in the R&D subsample the coe cient
even has a negative sign. Thus, after the treatment firms do not employ more R&D
personnel in absolute terms.
For our dependent wage variables, we find positive and significant treatment e↵ects
on all variables in both the entire and the R&D sample. The results for the percentage
of R&D wages are statistically significant at the one percent level (table 2, column 3)
and are in line with our findings on percentage of R&D personnel. In both samples, the
treatment e↵ect for percentage of R&D wages is larger than the coe cient on percentage
of R&D personnel, suggesting that the individual R&D employee wage increases. In
line with the findings on the percentage of R&D wages, the sum of R&D wages also
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increased significantly in both samples (table 2, column 4). On average, treated firms
spend 2,224.42 Swiss francs (CHF)13 more on R&D wages per month. Firms conducting
R&D spend 46,615.95 CHF more per month on R&D personnel, which are around six
monthly R&D employee wages.
These results suggest that individual R&D employee wages appear to have increased
after the establishment of the UAS. This finding could be attributable to the nature of the
novel skill sets of UAS graduates. If these skills are unique, and therefore so valuable to
private firms that they are willing to pay more for the novel R&D-specific skills, these firms
might replace their R&D personnel with UAS graduates. This explanation is consistent
with our findings on the stagnating number of R&D personnel.
In sum, the results in Table 2 show that firms experiencing an R&D-specific labor
supply shock actively perform R&D to a higher degree and spend larger sums on their
R&D personnel. However, this finding does not translate into an increase in the absolute
number of R&D personnel. In line with the stagnating number of R&D personnel, the
costs of R&D skills, i.e., R&D wages, appear to increase. We further assess the mecha-
nisms underlying these findings, i.e., precisely which types of firms might drive the e↵ects,
in section 5.2.
5.2 E↵ect Heterogeneity
At first glance, the insignificant treatment e↵ects on the number of R&D personnel con-
tradict the treatment e↵ects on the percentage of R&D personnel. However, a plausible
explanation for these results is that they are driven by small firms, in which only one
additional R&D employee increases the percentage of R&D personnel to a greater extent
than in large firms. These small firms can either be start-ups or existing firms engaging
more intensively in R&D. Adding to this explanation, larger firms might even deliberately
perform less R&D or outsource it to a smaller firm if the smaller firm has a competitive
advantage. Therefore, we provide a set of analyses that assess which firms drive our main
results.
13 1 CHF is roughly equivalent to 1 US dollar.
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To shed light on the question of whether the results in Section 5.1 are driven by start-
up firms or firms that start to engage in R&D after the R&D-specific labor supply shock,
we construct a binary dependent variable EM that indicates whether a firm conducts
R&D at the extensive margin. The variable EM equals one if a firm has at least one
R&D employee. Then, we estimate equation 1 with EM as dependent variable. The
result of this estimation is shown in Table 3 and suggests that firms in treated MS regions
do not have a higher probability of conducting R&D judging on the small and insignificant
treatment e↵ect14. This evidence suggests that neither start-up firms nor firms starting
to engage in R&D drive our main results15.
Table 3: OLS Estimation Result for Extensive
Margin
(1)
EM
UASi,t 0.30
(0.24)
Sample mean of dependent variable 5.82
R2 0.14
Observations 161,367
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. Model
includes intercept, year fixed e↵ects, MS region fixed ef-
fects, firm-level control variables, and region-level control
variables. Coe cient, standard error, and sample mean
of dependent variable are multiplied by 100 to represent
a percentage point change. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.01.
While on average the R&D-specific labor supply shock might not have led to more firms
conducting R&D, our main results might still be explained by heterogeneous treatment
e↵ects across firm size classes. Furthermore, an explanation for these results might still
14 The finding of an insignificant treatment e↵ect at the extensive margin is robust to using maximum
likelihood (ML) instead of OLS estimation (result available upon request)
15 That start-up firms founded after the treatment conduct R&D and thus drive the e↵ect may remain
possible. The treatment e↵ect in Table 3 might still be zero if (a) the number of start-up firms
conducting R&D and of those who do not outweigh each other, or if (b) some firms stopped to
conduct R&D while others started to do so.
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be the number of start-up firms or smaller firms starting to conduct R&D and the number
of larger firms stopping to conduct R&D outweighing one another. Another explanation
might be that the e↵ect varies with industry sector and only firms in sectors close to
STEM profit from the establishment of UAS.
Therefore, to assess whether our results are heterogeneous across firm size classes, we
split our sample into subsamples of firms with di↵erent firm sizes. We use the firm size
classes proposed in OECD (2015, p. 206), but group firms with 250 or more employees
together in order to maintain a reasonable subsample size. We then estimate equation 1
separately for each subsample, with RDP pct, RDP num, RDW pct, RDW sum, and EM as
dependent variables.
Table 4 provides the estimated treatment e↵ects for the di↵erent firm size classes.
We find positive and statistically significant treatment e↵ects on R&D personnel only for
firms with 50 to 99 employees. In addition, the coe cients in column 5 of Table 4 show
that for firms with 100 or more employees, the treatment e↵ect on the extensive margin is
negative and statistically significant at the five percent level, i.e., these firms have a lower
probability of conducting R&D. These findings are in line with the hypothesis that our
main results are driven by smaller firms, but not start-ups (which would have fewer than
50 employees shortly after being founded), implying that these firms did not have the
resources to train R&D personnel before the UAS establishment but can now recruit the
personnel they need from the labor market. However, because small firms were relatively
underrepresented in the ESS before 2002, the insignificant e↵ects for the lowest firm size
classes might be caused by too few pre-treatment observations, so that we still cannot
definitely rule out that start-ups contribute to the e↵ect16.
We proceed similarly to assess whether our main results are heterogeneous across
industry sectors and find that firms in sectors close to STEM seem to drive our main
results. Table 5 provides the estimation results for subsamples of firms in the di↵erent
industry sectors provided in our data through the NOGA 2002 classification17 (see SFSO,
16 When we create a subsample of firms with fewer than 100 employees and reproduce the estimations
for the extensive margin using this subsample, the treatment e↵ect is positive and statistically
significant at the five percent level (results available upon request).
17 For the survey year 1994, the ESS only provides the NOGA 1995 classification. We impute the
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Table 4: OLS Estimation Results by Firm Size Class
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Si Obs. RDP pct RDP num RDW pct RDW sum EM
UASi,t
Si  4 50,183 0.13 0.00 0.12 37.25 0.22
(0.12) (0.00) (0.12) (28.37) (0.19)
5  Si  9 31,741 0.24 0.01 0.22 119.52 0.42
(0.15) (0.01) (0.15) (81.37) (0.36)
10  Si  19 24,049 0.21 0.02 0.16 171.18 -0.39
(0.22) (0.03) (0.22) (251.94) (0.60)
20  Si  49 26,928 0.02 0.04 -0.02 187.93 -0.13
(0.23) (0.07) (0.23) (567.57) (0.73)
50  Si  99 13,850 0.51⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤ 0.49⇤⇤ 2,572.32⇤⇤ 0.33
(0.24) (0.16) (0.25) (1,278.83) (1.05)
100  Si  249 9,313 -0.48 -0.61 -0.51 -5,028.89 -3.07⇤⇤
(0.30) (0.43) (0.31) (3,419.31) (1.39)
250  Si 5,303 -0.32 -1.81 -0.32 -8,626.16 -4.34⇤⇤
(0.37) (4.77) (0.38) (36,684.10) (2.06)
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Notes: Results from separate regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include
intercept, year fixed e↵ects, MS region fixed e↵ects, firm-level control variables and region-level control
variables. Coe cients and standard errors in columns (1), (3), and (5) are multiplied by 100 to represent
percentage point changes. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
2002). These results exhibit that only firms in sector C (manufacture of goods) experience
a significant increase in percentage of R&D personnel, percentage of R&D wages and sum
of R&D wages. Additionally, the treatment e↵ects on some of the outcome variables for
firms in sectors K (real estate, renting, other) and O (other service activities) is significant
at the ten percent level. These two sectors comprise a mix of di↵erent subcategories, e.g.,
R&D as an explicit subcategory of sector K or sewage treatment and video production as
subcategories of sector O. The positive e↵ects could therefore be caused by firms in these
specific subcategories. Firms in sectors F (construction) and I (transport, communication)
NOGA 2002 classification for this survey in accordance with the correspondance tables provided by
the SFSO, see https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/basics/noga/publications-noga-2002-
1995.assetdetail.82758.html (last retrieved on March 21,
2017).
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experience negative e↵ects on the extensive margin, and firms in sector I also on percentage
of R&D personnel and percentage of R&D wages.
Our assessments of e↵ect heterogeneity suggest that firms with 50 to 99 employees
and firms in the manufacturing sector drive our main results. However, these results only
serve as an indicator of where the overall treatment e↵ect might come from and should be
interpreted with some caution. As the SFSO changed the sampling procedure for the ESS
with the survey of 2002, firms in some of the subsamples might be underrepresented before
2002, which might bias our results on e↵ect heterogeneity. Still, these results contribute
to a better understanding of the mechanism underlying the e↵ect of the R&D-specific
labor supply shock on firms’ R&D personnel.
5.3 Robustness Checks
To ensure that our estimation strategy is not misspecified, we perform two robustness
checks using di↵erent estimators. First, the OLS estimator might not be the most suit-
able estimator for all of our dependent variables. Specifically, the values of RDP pct and
RDW pct range from zero to one, so that the ML estimator might be the more appropriate
choice for these variables. Thus, for these two dependent variables, we estimate equation
1 using Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) fractional response model, with a logit model for
the conditional mean.
Appendix A.4 provides the regression results for percentage of R&D personnel and
percentage of R&D wages using the ML estimator, which confirm the magnitude of the
e↵ects we find using the OLS estimator (table 2). However, while the ML treatment e↵ects
for percentage of R&D wages in both the entire and the R&D sample are statistically
significant at the one percent level (as are the OLS treatment e↵ects), in the entire
sample the treatment e↵ect on percentage of R&D personnel is statistically significant
only at the ten percent level, and in the R&D sample the e↵ect is statistically insignificant.
Nevertheless, given the magnitudes of the e↵ects, their economic significance is still given.
Second, we use a quasi-panel to apply a fixed e↵ects (FE) estimation. As the ESS
data has the structure of repeated cross-sections, i.e., firms cannot be tracked over time,
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Table 5: OLS Estimation Results by Industry Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NOGA2002i Obs. RDP pct RDP num RDW pct RDW sum EM
UASi,t
A Agriculture 4,716 -0.15 -0.00 -0.15 -29.24 -0.15
and forestry (0.17) (0.01) (0.17) (39.97) (0.22)
C Mining and 671 -0.01 -0.00 -0.07 -687.12 -2.03
quarrying (0.60) (0.15) (0.58) (1137.87) (3.66)
D Manufacture 43,139 0.34⇤⇤ 1.21 0.32⇤⇤ 11,886.61⇤ 0.03
of goods (0.15) (0.81) (0.15) (6,664.40) (0.67)
E Electricity, 909 0.45 0.68 0.38 7,977.42 0.26
gas, water (0.41) (1.65) (0.36) (13,815.36) (2.87)
F Construction 9,558 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -167.94 -0.89⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (327.73) (0.41)
G Wholesale 23,466 -0.07 0.07 -0.04 115.02 0.17
and retail (0.08) (0.16) (0.08) (1,397.23) (0.42)
H Hotels and 7,343 0.01 0.00 0.01 29.45 0.14
restaurants (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (30.30) (0.10)
I Transport, 8,746 -0.14⇤ -0.35 -0.17⇤⇤ -3,851.99 -1.20⇤
communication (0.07) (0.34) (0.08) (3,542.52) (0.69)
J Financial 8,613 0.05 -0.06 0.01 -254.05 -0.21
intermediation (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (1,383.23) (0.67)
K Real estate, 26,185 0.62⇤ 0.14 0.55 294.32 0.61
renting, other (0.37) (0.39) (0.36) (2,908.90) (0.71)
M Education 4,977 -0.05 0.02 -0.10 -122.86 0.08
(0.19) (0.10) (0.19) (977.03) (0.85)
N Health, and 10,417 -0.12 0.04 -0.13 -89.57 -0.37
social work (0.12) (0.20) (0.11) (1,419.51) (0.52)
O Other service 12,627 0.48⇤ 0.11 0.49⇤ 719.66 1.38⇤⇤
activities (0.26) (0.07) (0.26) (689.58) (0.60)
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Notes: Results from separate regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include inter-
cept, year fixed e↵ects, MS region fixed e↵ects, firm-level control variables and region-level control variables.
Coe cients and standard errors in columns (1), (3), and (5) are multiplied by 100 to represent percentage
point changes. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Nomenclature of NOGA 2002 categories provided by
SFSO (2002), titles shortened for illustration (original titles provided in appendix A.6).
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we group observations by MS region, industry sector (on 2-digit level of NOGA 2002
classification), firm size, and year to obtain an unbalanced quasi-panel. We then calculate
the group18 averages of each variable entering the estimation model in equation 1 for each
survey year.
The quasi-panel FE estimation serves as a robustness check for two potential problems:
One one hand, it accounts for any unobserved group-specific heterogeneity, thereby helping
to overcome any violation of the parallel trends assumption that our tests in section 4.3
did not detect. On the other, as the SFSO increased the sampling size of the ESS in 2002,
we cannot exclude the possibility that this increase a↵ected the stratification criteria for
firm size and industry sector. By grouping firms as described, we eliminate any potential
bias that might arise from a change in stratification criteria by collapsing the data to
one cell per MS region, industry sector, firm size, and year. We run the quasi-panel FE
regressions only on the entire sample of firms, because too many cells remain vacant when
creating a quasi-panel from the R&D sample.
The quasi-panel FE estimations yield a treatment e↵ect of 0.25 percentage points on
percentage of R&D personnel (table A6, column 1 in the appendix), which is statistically
significant at the one percent level. Thus, this e↵ect is larger in magnitude and statistically
significant at a lower level compared to the treatment e↵ect obtained from the OLS
estimation (table 2, column 1). Again, in the quasi-panel FE estimations we do not find
a significant e↵ect on number of R&D personnel. The treatment e↵ect on percentage of
R&D wages is statistically significant at the one percent level and in magnitude similar
to the e↵ect on percentage of R&D personnel. The treatment e↵ect on sum of R&D
wages, however, is statistically insignificant, although in size equal to the OLS e↵ect.
Therefore, the quasi-panel FE results confirm the OLS results on percentage of R&D
personnel and number of R&D personnel, but yield no evidence for an increase in the
value of R&D-specific skills.
18 On average, a group consists of 2.98 firms per year.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate how an exogenous increase in R&D-specific labor supply
influences the R&D personnel of private firms, in terms of both employment and money
spent on R&D personnel. To do so, we exploit a reform in the Swiss education system, the
establishment of UAS during the 1990s. These UAS produce graduates with vocational
and applied research skills in STEM. Consequently, private firms located near a UAS
campus teaching STEM experience an R&D-specific labor supply shock in the form of
UAS graduates entering regional labor markets.
Applying a DiD design, we find that while the number of R&D personnel (the number
of employees with R&D as their main job activitiy), remains unchanged, the percentage
of R&D personnel (the number of employees with R&D as their main job activity relative
to the overall number of employees), increases significantly. Furthermore, we find that
treated firms spend more on the wages for R&D personnel, measured both as the per-
centage of R&D wages (the sum of wages paid to R&D personnel relative to the overall
wage sum) and the sum of R&D wages (the sum of wages paid to R&D personnel). Taken
together, these findings show that R&D-specific labor costs increased after the establish-
ment of the UAS, possibly because the novel skill sets of UAS graduates are unique and so
valuable for private firms that the market price for R&D-specific skills actually increases.
In turn, this explanation could imply that firms do not hire more R&D personnel due
to its increased market price but instead replace their R&D personnel with better-skilled
UAS graduates.
Our assessments of e↵ect heterogeneity suggest that the e↵ects we find are not driven
by start-up firms, but by firms with 50 to 99 employees that engage more intensively in
R&D, in combination with larger firms ceasing to conduct R&D. Furthermore, firms in
the manufacturing sector positively contribute to the overall e↵ects and conduct more
R&D, whereas firms in the construction and the transport and communication sector
reduce their R&D.
Although all our robustness checks confirm the average e↵ects we find and despite our
assessments of e↵ect heterogeneity, we cannot precisely determine which types of firms
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drive our results. In particular, start-ups and small firms (i.e., with fewer than 50 em-
ployees) might still be positively influenced by the R&D-specific labor supply shock. The
reason that we cannot identify any e↵ects for small firms might be their underrepresenta-
tion in the survey years before 2002, that is, before the treatment occurred. Furthermore,
despite the evidence we find on firms’ probability to conduct R&D, our inability to track
firms over time due to the data structure leaves room for speculation as to whether start-
ups contribute to the treatment e↵ect. Nonetheless, the result that firms engage in R&D
more intensively and spend more on R&D personnel remains unchallenged.
Our findings suggest that, by providing individuals with skills that are valuabe to
private firms, the policy reform of the UAS establishment enhanced regional innovative
activities. This interpretation implies that prior to the reform, firms faced costs that
were too high for training the employees they needed. Smaller firms, in particular, might
not have possessed the necessary resources for teaching applied research skills to the
same extent and with the same quality as do UAS. Assuming that larger firms possess
these resources and thus have privileged access to R&D-specific individual skills, the
new competition from smaller firms might explain their decreased engagement in R&D
if smaller firms have a competitive advantage. The availability of R&D-specific skills
to all firms and the competition that availability stimulates among private firms thus
foster regional innovative activities. Policy reforms aimed at increasing private innovative
activities through education should therefore consider that the contents of this education
have to meet the R&D-specific needs of private firms.
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Appendix
A.1 Definition of Outcome Variables
We calculate the two outcome variables percentage of R&D personnel (RDP pct, equation
3.1) and number of R&D personnel (RDP num, equation 3.2) in the following way:
RDP pcti =
PNi
j=1 rdjljPNi
j=1 lj
(3.1)
RDP numi = HR
rel
i Si
PNi
j=1 lj
Ni
(3.2)
with i: firm, j: employee, N : number of employee observations, rd: binary indicator of
R&D as main job activity, l: individual employment level (0 < l  1)19, and S: firm
size. As equations ?? and ?? show, we adjust these numbers to full-time equivalents
by weighting each employee observation with the individual employment level, thereby
avoiding potential biases caused by part-time employment.
For our wage outcome variables percentage of R&D wages (RDW pct, equation 4.1)
and sum of R&D wages (RDW sum, equation 4.2), we proceed similarly20:
RDW pcti =
PNi
j=1wjrdjPNi
j=1wj
(4.1)
RDW sumi = W
rel
i Si
PNi
j=1wj
Ni
(4.2)
withW rel: relative sum of R & D employee wages,W abs: absolute sum of R & D employee
wages, W avg: average R & D employee wage, and w: monthly wage21
19 For individuals with l > 1 we set l = 1
20 Before aggregating at the firm level, we deflate every wage observation in the dataset to 2010 prices
according to the Consumer Price Index provided by the SFSO, see
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/catalogues-databases.assetdetail.cc-d-
05.02.08.html (last retrieved on March 9,
2017).
21 The firms report wages in October of each survey year. To avoid any bias, we use the base salary
with no extra earnings such as overtime or bonus payments.
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A.2 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Percentage of R&D Personnel
Year
Control group Treatment group
Obs. Mean Min. Max. Obs. Mean Min. Max.
Panel A: Entire Sample
1994 2,105 0.83 0.00 100.00 3,849 1.13 0.00 100.00
1996 1,401 0.95 0.00 82.35 2,811 1.23 0.00 100.00
1998 1,945 0.87 0.00 90.14 3,435 1.00 0.00 100.00
2000 1,884 1.25 0.00 100.00 3,278 1.26 0.00 100.00
2002 10,113 0.79 0.00 100.00 15,696 1.14 0.00 100.00
2004 10,526 0.79 0.00 100.00 17,700 1.18 0.00 100.00
2006 10,659 0.79 0.00 100.00 18,290 1.22 0.00 100.00
2008 10,741 0.78 0.00 100.00 17,888 1.25 0.00 100.00
2010 10,652 1.16 0.00 100.00 18,394 1.72 0.00 100.00
Total 60,026 0.88 0.00 100.00 101,341 1.28 0.00 100.00
Panel B: R&D Sample
1994 115 15.18 0.15 100.00 245 17.70 0.03 100.00
1996 92 14.50 0.07 82.35 205 16.84 0.10 100.00
1998 99 17.01 0.06 90.14 200 17.22 0.15 100.00
2000 125 18.87 0.36 100.00 204 20.20 0.18 100.00
2002 512 15.58 0.07 100.00 929 19.18 0.04 100.00
2004 543 15.34 0.21 100.00 1,014 20.54 0.03 100.00
2006 569 14.88 0.02 100.00 1,028 21.67 0.02 100.00
2008 545 15.34 0.16 100.00 1,030 21.63 0.01 100.00
2010 674 18.30 0.18 100.00 1,280 24.73 0.01 100.00
Total 3,274 16.06 0.02 100.00 6,135 21.22 0.01 100.00
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Note: Variable values multiplied by 100.
28
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for Number of R&D Personnel
Year
Control group Treatment group
Obs. Mean Min. Max. Obs. Mean Min. Max.
Panel A: Entire Sample
1994 2,105 1.20 0.00 465.84 3,849 2.41 0.00 2,033.77
1996 1,401 1.85 0.00 508.96 2,811 3.13 0.00 1,773.45
1998 1,945 1.66 0.00 831.64 3,435 2.39 0.00 1,815.95
2000 1,884 2.35 0.00 1,752.89 3,278 1.92 0.00 788.23
2002 10,113 0.54 0.00 196.35 15,696 1.09 0.00 3,158.07
2004 10,526 0.60 0.00 267.65 17,700 0.96 0.00 2,971.25
2006 10,659 0.70 0.00 1,262.69 18,290 1.10 0.00 3,385.87
2008 10,741 0.63 0.00 356.38 17,888 1.25 0.00 3,773.93
2010 10,652 0.81 0.00 1,212.37 18,394 1.31 0.00 4,248.98
Total 60,026 0.79 0.00 1752.89 101,341 1.32 0.00 4,248.98
Panel B: R&D Sample
1994 115 21.99 0.21 465.84 245 37.88 0.15 2,033.77
1996 92 28.16 0.99 508.96 205 42.97 0.22 1,773.45
1998 99 32.54 0.76 831.64 200 40.98 0.80 1,815.95
2000 125 35.49 0.36 1,752.89 204 30.85 0.30 788.23
2002 512 10.61 0.09 196.35 929 18.45 0.09 3,158.07
2004 543 11.58 0.05 267.65 1,014 16.78 0.12 2,971.25
2006 569 13.07 0.04 1,262.69 1,028 19.58 0.02 3,385.87
2008 545 12.48 0.10 356.38 1,030 21.69 0.03 3,773.93
2010 674 12.81 0.09 1,212.37 1,280 18.85 0.01 4,248.98
Total 3,274 14.47 0.04 1,752.89 6,135 21.73 0.01 4,248.98
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
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Table A3: Descriptive Statistics for Percentage of R&D Wages
Year
Control group Treatment group
Obs. Mean Min. Max. Obs. Mean Min. Max.
Panel A: Entire Sample
1994 2,105 0.88 0.00 100.00 3,849 1.19 0.00 100.00
1996 1,401 0.97 0.00 81.77 2,811 1.31 0.00 100.00
1998 1,945 0.93 0.00 90.75 3,435 1.04 0.00 100.00
2000 1,884 1.32 0.00 100.00 3,278 1.30 0.00 100.00
2002 10,113 0.85 0.00 100.00 15,696 1.17 0.00 100.00
2004 10,526 0.84 0.00 100.00 17,700 1.20 0.00 100.00
2006 10,659 0.85 0.00 100.00 18,290 1.21 0.00 100.00
2008 10,741 0.82 0.00 100.00 17,888 1.26 0.00 100.00
2010 10,652 1.21 0.00 100.00 18,394 1.74 0.00 100.00
Total 60,026 0.93 0.00 100.00 101,341 1.31 0.00 100.00
Panel B: R&D Sample
1994 115 16.08 0.20 100.00 245 18.76 0.15 100.00
1996 92 14.70 0.13 81.77 205 17.91 0.07 100.00
1998 99 18.29 0.06 90.75 200 17.82 0.23 100.00
2000 125 19.82 0.50 100.00 204 20.84 0.16 100.00
2002 512 16.84 0.08 100.00 929 19.82 0.05 100.00
2004 543 16.34 0.15 100.00 1,014 20.89 0.04 100.00
2006 569 15.91 0.05 100.00 1,028 21.56 0.04 100.00
2008 545 16.12 0.16 100.00 1,030 21.82 0.01 100.00
2010 674 19.10 0.16 100.00 1,280 25.02 0.01 100.00
Total 3,274 17.01 0.05 100.00 6,135 21.57 0.01 100.00
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Note: Variable values multiplied by 100.
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Table A4: Descriptive Statistics for Sum of R&D Wages
Year
Control group Treatment group
Obs. Mean Min. Max. Obs. Mean Min. Max.
Panel A: Entire Sample
1994 2,105 8,068.66 0.00 2,798,847.25 3,849 16,581.12 0.00 13,639,992.00
1996 1,401 12,153.04 0.00 3,251,181.00 2,811 22,345.71 0.00 12,006,123.00
1998 1,945 11,501.58 0.00 5,885,313.50 3,435 17,482.16 0.00 12,506,121.00
2000 1,884 17,396.94 0.00 12,678,588.00 3,278 14,910.08 0.00 6,347,579.00
2002 10,113 4,095.16 0.00 1,667,844.63 15,696 8,800.81 0.00 25,209,066.00
2004 10,526 4,571.27 0.00 2397,403.25 17,700 7,857.12 0.00 24,158,538.00
2006 10,659 5,500.91 0.00 10,416,656.00 18,290 9,194.20 0.00 27,607,510.00
2008 10,741 5,222.30 0.00 3,013,051.00 17,888 11,000.78 0.00 35,747,660.00
2010 10,652 6,882.08 0.00 12,081,073.00 18,394 12,069.73 0.00 39,537,800.00
Total 60,026 6,109.41 0.00 12,678,588.00 101,341 10,851.72 0.00 39,537,800.00
Panel B: R&D Sample
1994 115 147,691.64 4,669.14 2,798,847.25 245 260,492.80 2,755.00 13,639,992.00
1996 92 185,069.62 4,000.00 3,251,181.00 205 306,408.78 3,504.62 12,006,123.00
1998 99 225,965.48 5,000.00 5,885,313.50 200 300,256.09 5,300.00 12,506,121.00
2000 125 262,206.62 4,207.68 12,678,588.00 204 239,584.44 4,500.00 6,347,579.00
2002 512 80,887.42 3,539.70 1,667,844.63 929 148,694.80 3,750.00 25,209,066.00
2004 543 88,613.65 280.00 2,397,403.25 1,014 137,151.00 3,049.52 24,158,538.00
2006 569 103,047.80 750.00 10,416,656.00 1,028 163,581.61 2,545.45 27,607,510.00
2008 545 102,922.37 2,000.00 3,013,051.00 1,030 191,050.44 2,000.00 35,747,660.00
2010 674 108,765.47 2,560.00 12,081,073.00 1,280 173,445.83 1,978.00 39,537,800.00
Total 3,274 112,010.92 280.00 12,678,588.00 6,135 179,254.13 1,978.00 39,537,800.00
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
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A.3 Trends of Dependent Variables in Treatment and Control
Group
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Figure A1: Trends of Percentage of R&D Personnel for Treatment and Control Group
(Entire Sample)
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Note: Variable values multiplied by 100.
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Figure A2: Trends of Percentage of R&D Personnel for Treatment and Control Group
(R&D Sample)
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Note: Variable values multiplied by 100.
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Figure A3: Trends of Number of R&D Personnel in Treatment and Control Group (Entire
Sample)
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
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Figure A4: Trends of Number of R&D Personnel in Treatment and Control Group (Entire
Sample)
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
33
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Year
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
R
&
D
W
ag
es
Control group
Treatment group
Figure A5: Trends of Percentage of R&D Wages in Treatment and Control Group (Entire
Sample)
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Note: Variable values multiplied by 100.
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Figure A6: Trends of Percentage of R&D Wages in Treatment and Control Group (R&D
Sample)
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Note: Variable values multiplied by 100.
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Figure A7: Trends of Sum of R&D Wages in Treatment and Control Group (Entire
Sample)
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
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Figure A8: Trends of Sum of R&DWages in Treatment and Control Group (R&D Sample)
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
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A.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Table A5: ML Estimation Results
(1) (2)
RDP pct RDW pct
Panel A: Entire Sample
UASi,t 13.14⇤ 20.31⇤⇤⇤
(6.82) (3.55)
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.13
Observations 161,367 161,367
Panel B: R&D Sample
UASi,t 9.76 11.35⇤⇤⇤
(6.13) (2.87)
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.13
Observations 9,409 9,409
Source: Own calculations with data from
the ESS.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table reports marginal e↵ects. All mod-
els include intercept, year fixed e↵ects,
MS region fixed e↵ects, firm-level con-
trol variables and region-level control vari-
ables. Marginal e↵ects and standard er-
rors are multiplied by 100 to represent per-
cent changes. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.01.
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A.5 Quasi-panel Fixed E↵ects Estimation
Table A6: Quasi-panel FE Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RDP pct RDP num RDW pct RDW sum
UASi,t 0.25⇤⇤⇤ 0.26 0.24⇤⇤⇤ 2,201.06
(0.09) (0.27) (0.09) (2,380.78)
Sample mean of dependent variable 1.43 2.27 1.49 18.180,90
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 54,206 54,206 54,206 54,206
Source: Own calculations with data from the ESS.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include intercept, year fixed e↵ects,
grouped firm-level control variables and region-level control variables. Coe cients and standard
errors in columns (1) and (3) are multiplied by 100 to represent pp changes. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤
p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
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A.6 NOGA 2002 Categories of Industry Sector
Table A7: NOGA 2002 Categories of Industry Sector
Category Title
A Agriculture and forestry
B Fishing and fish farming
C Mining and quarrying
D Manufacture of goods
E Electricity, gas and water supply
F Construction
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and consumer durables
H Hotels and restaurants
I Transport, storage and communication
J Financial intermediation; insurance (excluding compulsory social security)
K Real estate, renting and related activities; other business activities
L Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
M Education
N Health, veterinary and social work
O Other community, social and personal service activities
P Private household
Q Extra-territorial organizations and bodies
Source: SFSO (2002)
Notes: Categories B, P, and Q not included in the ESS sample we use for our estimations. Category L
excluded because it does not contain private firms.
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